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COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
OKLAHOMA SURFACE DAMAGES ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent enactment of the Oklahoma Surface Damages Act' al-
ters the common law approach to liability for damages to the surface
estate caused by an oil and gas operator.' Heretofore, the owner of the
surface estate had to bear the expense of damages reasonably caused by
the operator's efforts to gain control of the oil or gas.3 The Oklahoma
Act transfers liability for these damages from the surface owner to the
operator.4
This shift is in keeping with similar legislative enactments under-
taken by a small group of states5 and the constitutional issues raised by
these acts could equally apply to the Oklahoma Act. The Oklahoma
Court of Appeals recently had the opportunity to address the constitu-
tional issues surrounding the Act in its decision in Bow/es v.
Kretchmar.6 The court, however, avoided a direct confrontation by
finding that the leases in question were not affected by the Act since
they were entered into prior to the effective date of the Act.7 The court
based its decision on language in the Act that they interpreted as
preventing retroactive application to old leases, thus leaving the consti-
tutionality of the Oklahoma Act in question.8 This Comment will fo-
1. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-318.9 (Supp. 1983).
2. An operator is defined as "a mineral owner or lessee who is engaged in drilling or prepar-
ing to drill for oil or gas." Id. § 318.2.
3. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
5. Four other states, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and West Virginia, have
passed similar statutes. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 82-10-501 to -511 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 38-11.1-01 to -. 10 (1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to -11 (1983); W. VA. CODE
§§ 22-4C-1 to -9 (Supp. 1984).
6. See 55 OKLA. B.J. 967 (May 12, 1984).
7. Id. at 968. This was the same approach taken in an earlier unreported decision in an
Oklahoma federal district court. See Hughes Group, Inc. v. Morgan, No. 82-C-995 (N.D. Okla.
filed Nov. 19, 1982).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 27-32.
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cus on the various constitutional issues raised by the Act and predict
that the judicial response will be to find the Act constitutional.
II. EFFECT OF THE ACT ON OKLAHOMA COMMON LAW
A piece of real property has at least two distinct estates: the sur-
face estate and the mineral estate that lies underneath.9 When the es-
tates are sold to two different parties it becomes particularly important
to define the rights and obligations of the two parties since their inter-
ests may conflict with one another.,'
In Oklahoma, the general proposition has been that the mineral
estate is dominant and the surface estate subservient." This does not
mean that the rights of the mineral owner absolutely preempt the rights
of the surface owner, but it does mean that the operator of the mineral
estate has an implied surface easement that allows him to do whatever
is reasonably necessary to explore, develop and produce the minerals.'2
Consequently, the Oklahoma surface owner has not been entitled to
any compensation for damages sustained from the operator's reason-
able exploration, development and production of the mineral estate,1 3
unless the parties expressly agreed otherwise. 14 The reasoning behind
this approach appears to be based on a recognition that it would be
illogical to grant a mineral estate without providing some means for the
mineral owner to remove the minerals' 5 and upon the principle that
one should not be liable for reasonable damages caused through the
9. See 6 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 3096
(4th ed. 1962).
10. See id.
11. See, e.g., Wellsville Oil Co. v. Carver, 206 Okla. 181, 183, 242 P.2d 151, 154 (1952); Mid-
Continent Petroleum Co. v. Rhodes, 205 Okla. 651, 651, 240 P.2d 95, 96 (1951). See Note, Oiland
Gas: Surface Damages, Operators, and the Oil and Gas Attorney, 36 OKLA. L. REv. 414, 416
(1983).
12. See, e.g., Tenneco Oil Co. v. Allen, 515 P.2d 1391, 1396 (Okla. 1973); Melton v. Sneed,
188 Okla. 388, 390, 109 P.2d 509, 512 (1940); Sanders v. Davis, 79 Okla. 253, 256, 192 P. 694, 697
(1920). See Note, supra note 11, at 414; Recent Development, Surface Damages in Oklahoma:
Procedures for Payments and Penalties, 18 TULSA L.J. 338, 340 (1982).
13. See Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Dacus, 325 P.2d 1035, 1036 (Okla. 1958); Wilcox Oil Co. v.
Lawson, 301 P.2d 686, 688 (Okla. 1956). See Note, supra note 11, at 416. Any unreasonable
damage sustained is compensable to the surface owner under several different legal theories. See
Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Brown, 477 P.2d 67, 71 (Okla. 1970) (nuisance); Superior Oil Co. v. King,
324 P.2d 847, 848 (Okla. 1958) (strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity); Hamon v. Gard-
ner, 315 P.2d 669, 675 (Okla. 1957) (negligence). See also Recent Development, supra note 12, at
340.
14. In fact, oil and gas leases and deeds often include provisions that require the operator of
the mineral estate to compensate the surface owner for all damage to the surface. See Recent
Development, supra note 12, at 340-41.
15. See Note, supra note 11, at 415.
19841
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exercise of a legal right.'6
The Oklahoma Act, in the absence of express provisions to the
contrary, shifts liability from the surface owner to the operator of the
mineral estate by requiring him to enter negotiations for the payment
of surface damages.' 7 If agreement is not reached, independent ap-
praisers are appointed to recommend a settlement figure to the parties
and the court.' 8 Accordingly, the Act does not appear to deprive the
operator of the the right to use the surface, but it effectively makes him
strictly liable for any damage to the surface.' 9
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OKLAHOMA ACT
The Oklahoma Act was modeled after similar statutes passed by
four other states.20 Questions regarding the constitutionality of these
statutes have been raised, but there has been no conclusive judicial de-
termination2' and commentators on the subject have reached different
conclusions. 2 The most obvious constitutional problems are raised by
the contract 23 and takings24 clauses of the United States Constitution.
A. Contract Clause
The contract clause declares that "No State shall . . . pass any
• ..Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts." 25  This provision is
expressed in absolute terms that appear to completely forbid states
from altering contracts. If this interpretation is correct, the Oklahoma
16. See Recent Development, supra note 12, at 345.
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.5 (Supp. 1983).
18. Id.
19. See Hultin, Recent Developments in Statutory and Judicial Accommodation Between Sur-
face and Mineral Owners, 28 RoCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1021, 1038 (1983); Recent Development,
supra note 12, at 347.
20. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
22. See, Dycus, Legislative Clarification of the Correlative Rights of Surface and Mineral Own.
ers, 33 VAND. L. REV. 871, 907-17 (1980) (concludes that various legislative responses to the con-
flict between the two estates are constitutional); Lowe, Eastern Oil and Gas Operations: Do Recent
Developments Suggest New Answers to Old Problems?, E. MIN. INST. 20-1, 20-18 to 20-20 (1983)
(Professor Lowe sees arguments for and against constitutionality); Pearce, Surface Damages and
the Oil and Gas Operator in North Dakota, 58 N.D.L. REV. 457, 491-99 (1982) (concludes that the
North Dakota Act is unconstitutional); Note, supra note 11, at 419-26 (determines that the
Oklahoma Act is unconstitutional); Recent Development, supra note 12, at 345-48 (questions con-
stitutionality of the Oklahoma Act); 35th OIL & GAS INST. 1, 21-39 (Matthew Bender 1984) (Pro-
fessor Lowe now concludes that surface damages acts are constitutional).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I.
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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Act would be unconstitutional if any contracts existing on the effective
date of the Act were altered by the Act.26
The Oklahoma Act appears to avoid conffict with the contract
clause by stating that, "Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
impair existing contractual rights ... - This language was inter-
preted by the Oklahoma Court of Appeals, in its recent decision in
Bowles v. Kretchmar,28 to make the Act only applicable to lease con-
tracts entered into after the effective date of the Act.29 In that case, a
lessor entered into a lease agreement that made the lessee responsible
for damage to growing crops caused by the lessee's drilling operations.
The lessor attempted to make the lessee liable for all damage to the
surface because of Oklahoma's new Surface Damages Act.30 The court
of appeals held that the Act was not applicable to the lease in question
since it was entered into prior to the effective date of the Act.31 The
decision was based upon the view that the legislature intended the Act
to only be applied to future leases so that existing rights would not be
disturbed.32 This interpretation avoids conffict with the contract clause
since no contractual relationships in existence on the effective date of
the Act were disturbed.
While this interpretation may be logical, it is not the only possible
construction of the statute. The United States Supreme Court recog-
nized early in the 19th century that all contracts incorporate the law of
the state at the time of contracting,33 thus preventing parties from mak-
ing a contract contrary to state law and relying upon the contract clause
to make that law invalid.34  Later in the 19th century, the Supreme
26. Any constitutional challenge based on the contract clause assumes that the surface ease-
ment the common law grants to the mineral owner is implied as a part of the understanding
between the parties when they enter the agreement. If it is a right only applied by courts in order
to reach an equitable result, the right was never a part of the contract and the contract clause
would never prevent a state from prohibiting a court's use of this equitable remedy. See Note,
supra note 11, at 420-22. This author argues that the right must be implied as forming a part of
the agreement since the parties must have anticipated that the mineral estate owner would need to
use the surface in order to gain control of the subsurface. Id. at 421. If this is the case, the
contract clause would present a possible limitation.
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.7 (Supp. 1983).
28. 55 OKLA. B.J. 967 (May 12, 1984).
29. Id. at 968.
30. Id. at 967.
31. Id. at 968.
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 132, 213 (1827).
34. Justice Holmes succinctly stated it this way: "One whose rights, such as they are, are
subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract
about them." Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357 (1908).
1984]
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Court recognized that a state's police power is a part of that state's
sovereign authority and must be incorporated by implication into con-
tracts as a part of existing state law.35 In other words, every contract
incorporates a recognition that a state may invoke its police power to
protect the "health, safety, morals, or general welfare" 36 of the public,
even if it means altering terms in the contract. In earlier years, the
police power was only applied in limited circumstances, but it has been
expanded to encompass more concerns, including economic ones. 37
Accordingly, every contract recognizes that a state may invoke its po-
lice power, even for economic concerns, to alter contracts without run-
ning afoul of the contract clause. The most recent decisions recognize a
certain vitality in the clause by insisting that any contract modifications
by the state further some public purpose,38 but the clause is still not a
significant bar to contract modification of agreements between private
parties.39
By stating that "[n]othing herein contained shall be construed to
impair existing contractual rights. .. "4 the Oklahoma legislature may
have recognized that these "existing contractual fights" include the leg-
islature's implied authority to modify contracts through exercise of the
police power. Accordingly, the legislature may have been stating its
determination that nothing contained in the Act could be construed to
impair existing contractual rights since the Act was promulgated as a
part of its police power and, thus, became a part of all existing con-
tracts. The result of this interpretation is that the legislature's inclusion
35. See, e.g., Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 481-83 (1905); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.
814, 819 (1880); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878); West River Bridge Co. v.
Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 532-36 (1848); see also Note, Legislative Impairment af Natural Gas
Contracts: Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 19 TULSA L.J. 384, 386 &
n.20 (traces progression of this concept).
36. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978); Nectow v.
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 818 (1880).
37. See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 437 (1934) (first explicit recog-
nition that states could invoke their police power based on economic concerns); see also Note,
Revival of the Contract Clause: Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus and United States Trust
Co. v. New Jersey, 65 VA. L. REv. 377, 382-83 (1979) (emphasizes the importance of Blaisdell in
adding economic concerns to the state's police power).
38. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
According to this decision, there must be a substantial contract impairment that operates to
achieve a "significant and legitimate public purpose." Id. at 411. This purpose may only be
achieved through the contractual impairment if the impairment "is based upon reasonable condi-
tions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose . Id. at 412 (quoting United
States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1977)).
39. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983); Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983).
40. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.7 (Supp. 1983).
[Vol. 20:60
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of the above language had nothing to do with whether the Act could be
applied prospectively or retroactively. Instead, it was a mere declara-
tion of the State's power to modify contracts without running afoul of
the contract clause. If it is correct to interpret this language in this
manner, there is no reason to think the Act could not apply to leases
entered into prior to the effective date of the Act.
While the Act could be interpreted to apply to leases entered into
prior to the Act, it is unlikely that Oklahoma courts will adopt an inter-
pretation that requires such strained logic. It is more likely that the
courts will apply the Act prospectively since its logic is much more ap-
parent. Additionally, Oklahoma courts presume prospective applica-
tion unless there is a clear expression of a contrary intent.41
Consequently, Oklahoma courts will likely continue to find the Act ap-
plicable only to leases entered into after the Act's effective date.
B. Takings Clause
Although it may not be immediately apparent, the greatest threat
to the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Act is the takings clause of the
fifth amendment.42 The takings clause recognizes the natural law con-
cept of eminent domain which allows the government to take or de-
stroy property.43 The power of eminent domain, however, is limited by
the requirements that it be exercised for public use and be accompa-
nied by just compensation to the injured property owner.' The takings
concept of the fifth amendment has been incorporated through the
fourteenth amendment so that it also applies to state governments. 45
As a result, it is arguable that passage by the Oklahoma legislature of
the Act involved an exercise of the State's power of eminent domain
since requiring the operator of the mineral estate to compensate for
surface damages is a partial taking of the operator's surface easement.
Clearly, the Oklahoma legislature has the right to exercise the power of
eminent domain,46 but any attendant taking of private property must
41. See, e.g., Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363, 1365 (Okla. 1973); Board of Trustees v. Kern,
366 P.2d 415, 419 (Okla. 1961); State v. Ward, 189 Okla. 532, 538-39, 118 P.2d 216, 223 (1941).
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
43. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 480-81 (2d ed. 1983). The
recognition is not explicit; rather, it is tacit since the fifth amendment is expressed in terms of a
limitation on the government's right to take property. Any such taking must be for a public pur-
pose and accompanied by just compensation. Id.
44. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
45. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 122 (1978); Chicago, B. &
Q. R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
46. See Eichman v. Oklahoma City, 84 Okla. 20, 21, 202 P. 184, 185 (1921).
1984]
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be for public use and accompanied by just compensation. 47
Interpreting the Oklahoma Act to apply only to future leases, as
the Bowles court did, appears to circumvent the takings clause because
the future operator can not claim a right to cause reasonable damage to
the surface as his predecessor could under the common law. Accord-
ingly, the future operator can not complain that his right to inflict rea-
sonable damage to the surface has been taken from him since he never
had that right in the beginning. Additionally, leases that were in effect
before the passage of the Act will not be affected since the Act has been
interpreted as not being retroactive.
The Bowles decision does not, however, dispose of the issue as
neatly as it might appear. The decision focused on the date of the
lease,4" but if the surface and mineral estates have been severed, the
date of the severance is also relevant. If the estates were severed before
the enactment of the Oklahoma Act, the owner of the mineral estate
would have an implied surface easement, including the right to inflict
reasonable damage to the surface. It is possible that the right could be
lost if the land is subsequently leased after the passage of the Act. For
example, suppose that A purchased a mineral estate in Blackacre,
Oklahoma in 1981 and negotiated a lease with B in 1983 after the
Oklahoma Act went into effect. The compensation for A's lease49 will
likely be diminished because B will be aware that he must compensate
the surface owner for surface damages. Quite clearly A has lost a por-
tion of the value of his mineral estate even though he purchased the
estate before the Act went into effect.
The response of Oklahoma courts may be to follow the same ap-
proach the Bowles court used regarding leases and hold that the Act
only applies to severed mineral estates that were severed after the effec-
tive date of the Act. This approach, however, creates a pragmatic prob-
lem since many existing leases are held on mineral estates severed
before the effective date of the Act. If the Bowles interpretation is ap-
plied to severances, all leases on mineral estates severed prior to the
Act would not be covered by the Act. This would virtually render the
Act nugatory.
The better approach would be to hold that the Act applies to prior
47. Id See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. Bowles, 55 OKLA. B.J. at 968.
49. Compensation for an oil or gas lease typically includes a cash payment for executing the
lease, delay rentals, and royalties. See R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS §§ 2.3-2.5, at
48-61 (2d ed. 1983).
[Vol. 20:60
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severed mineral estates. This approach is more practical because it
avoids the problem mentioned above. It also appears to be the legally
correct view because the Act only prohibits impairment of existing con-
tractual relations.5 0 A contract that conveyed the mineral estate prior
to the Act would not impair an existing contractual relation because the
contract would be fully performed by both parties before the Act went
into effect.
This approach has the effect of furthering the intent of the legisla-
ture by making the Act applicable to future leases, regardless of the
severance date. It also avoids conflict with the contract clause since no
existing contractual relationships are impaired. It does not, however,
circumvent the takings issue since the owner of the severed mineral
estate is still deprived of a portion of his rights that accompany the
implied surface easement. Situations like this make it necessary to
more closely examine the Act to determine its constitutionality. To be
constitutional, the taking must be for the benefit of the public and the
operator of the mineral estate must be properly compensated.
1. Public Use Requirement
An initial inspection of the Oklahoma Act leaves the impression
that the Act achieves no public purpose since it appears to directly ben-
efit only the owners of severed surface estates.' Even if this were
true,52 the mere fact that a small group of private individuals is en-
riched by the taking of property from other individuals does not, of
itself, render an act unconstitutional. If such a taking also achieves a
public purpose, the state may justifiably exercise its power of eminent
domain and take the property.5 3 Accordingly, one critical determina-
tion is whether the Oklahoma Act achieves any public purpose.
The Act does not specifically enumerate the public purposes the
50. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.7 (Supp. 1983).
51. See Note, supra note 11, at 424.
52. Even landowners that retain mineral interests directly benefit from the Act. See infra
notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
53. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954). Some state courts construe the public use
requirement of takings clauses in their own constitutions more narrowly by strictly scrutinizing
transfers to private parties. See, e.g., Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 7-8 (Ky. 1979);
Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C. 339, 344-45, 247 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1978); Hogue v. Port of Seattle,
54 Wash. 2d 799, 838, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (1959). Oklahoma does not follow this strict approach
since it allows transfers to private parties so long as the public welfare is enhanced. See Delfield v.
Tulsa, 191 Okla. 541, 545, 131 P.2d 754, 758 (1942); see also Ross, Transferring Land to Private
Entities by the Power ofEminent Domain, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 355 (1983) (argues that there are
no valid reasons for looking at private transfers more strictly).
1984]
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 20 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol20/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JO URNAL
legislature intended to further by its enactment, but other states that
have passed surface damages acts specifically cite the need for protect-
ing individuals engaged in agricultural production since the economies
of those states depend upon agriculture.54 These states have recognized
a need to protect the surface of land in order to protect agricultural
production.55 The protection of agriculture might also be a compelling
public policy consideration in Oklahoma since much of the State's
economy is agriculturally based5 6 and the possibility for surface dam-
age is great due to the large amount of oil and gas activity within
Oklahoma. 7
In the absence of specific legislative findings and purposes, how-
ever, one can only speculate as to the public purposes the legislature
intended to achieve through passage of the Oklahoma Act. It has been
suggested that statutes that differ from surface damages acts, but which
are still aimed at resolving disputes between surface and mineral own-
ers, promote a number of broad public purposes including encouraging
efficient land use, assuring fairness in dealings between surface and
mineral owners, and eliminating uncertainty in the law. 8 Although it
appears to be a safe assumption that the public is at least marginally
benefitted by all these goals, such goals should not be accepted as legiti-
mate public purposes furthered by the Oklahoma Act without further
inquiry.
In determining whether the Oklahoma Act encourages efficient use
of land and consequently furthers a public purpose, it is necessary to
compare the probable efficacy of the Act with the common law ap-
proach. On the one hand, under the common law, the mineral owner
was encouraged to promote efficient use of the surface since he was
precluded from doing anything unreasonable in his quest for the min-
erals.59 The mineral owner could not, for example, act in a cavalier
fashion and unnecessarily destroy the surface owner's wheat crop, or
ruin his groundwater or kill his livestock by failing to properly dispose
of salt water used in the drilling operation, or act in any other negligent
manner without being subject to liability for any unreasonable and un-
54. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-10-501 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-11.1-01 to -02
(1980); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 45-5A-1 to -2 (1983); W. VA. CODE § 22-4C-1 (Supp. 1983).
55. See id.
56. See THE WORLD ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 1979, at 694 (G. Delury ed. 1979).
57. See id.
58. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 916-17.
59. See supra text accompanying note 12.
[Vol. 20:60
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necessary damages.6" Given the conflicting nature of the two estates,
the common law tried to promote efficient use of both.6 On the other
hand, the mineral owner may still not act with the prudence necessary
to assure efficient land use since he recognizes that the landowner can
only recover damages for the mineral owner's unreasonable use by
resorting to the judicial process. The mineral owner may be willing to
cause excessive damage in his belief that the landowner will not at-
tempt to assert his rights.62 Additionally, if the landowner decides to
go to court he will be confronted with the fact that "reasonableness"
and "necessity" are abstract legal concepts that make it difficult to as-
sure that he will recover anything from the mineral owner.63 The
Oklahoma Act helps change this situation by providing that the surface
will be protected by imposing virtual strict liability on the mineral
owner.' The mineral owner could hardly be expected to act in an un-
reasonable manner in selecting and employing methods to produce the
minerals if he has to bear the burden for any attendant losses. Under
these circumstances, efficient use of both the surface and subsurface is
maximized to the natural limit allowable by these two confficting
estates.
The state may also have an interest in assuring fairness in dealings
between the owners of the mineral and surface estates. This is particu-
larly appropriate since the typical scenario involves an individual land-
owner on one side and a large mining company, drilling company, or
public utility on the other side. Considering the lack of knowledge
many landowners might have of modern mining and drilling opera-
tions, an agreement regarding liability for surface damages might not
be reached at arm's length.65 The Oklahoma Act helps protect these
surface owners from overreaching by requiring the negotiation of sur-
face damages and calling for the appointment of appraisers by a district
60. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
61. Some courts have slightly altered the common law by applying the "due regard" doctrine.
This doctrine requires the mineral owner to exercise due regard for the rights of the surface owner
by requiring the mineral owner to select an alternative means for gaining control of the mineral
estate that is less destructive of the surface. If an alternative means is not available, the mineral
owner may proceed regardless of the ensuing surface damages. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Jones,
470 S.W.2d 618, 621-22 (Tex. 1971).
62. This scenario seems the more likely when one considers that the typical situation involves
an individual landowner on one side and a large drilling or mining company as mineral owner or
lessee on the other. The landowner could be intimidated into not taking the appropriate steps to
protect his rights. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
63. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 879-81.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19.
65. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 884-85.
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court if an agreement is not reached." This assures the landowner of
fair compensation for damages to his land without having to negotiate
his own agreement.
In achieving fairness between contracting parties, the landowner
that has retained the mineral estate is also benefitted. If he decides to
try to produce the minerals from his subsurface estate he will, in all
likelihood, lease the mineral estate to a mining company, drilling com-
pany, or a public utility.67 This lessee is then subrogated to the rights
of the mineral owner and thus obtains a present and vested interest in
the surface.68 Under the common law approach, the lessee was not
liable to the landowner for reasonable damages to the surface.69 Under
the Oklahoma Act, since the operator of the mineral estate, which is
usually a lessee, is required to enter negotiations for payment of surface
damages70 the lessee is liable to the landowner for all surface damages.
This is so notwithstanding the fact that the landowner also owns the
mineral estate. This result seems unfair since the lessee must compen-
sate the landowner for surface damages despite the fact the landowner
also owns the mineral estate. The result, however, makes sense when it
is realized that the unsuspecting landowner will not think he is liable
for such damages at the time he contracts with the lessee. Conse-
quently, the landowner will often do a poor job of representing his in-
terests.7 The Oklahoma Act attempts to eliminate this problem.
Viewing the elimination of uncertainty in the law as a public pur-
pose is improper; instead, it should be regarded as a vehicle for effectu-
ating other public purposes such as reducing societal "demoralization
costs."72 To help define this concept, imagine the landowner that pur-
sues his right to be free from unreasonable and unnecessary damage to
his land by suing the mineral owner for his alleged excessive use of the
surface easement. If the courts hand down consistent and fair decisions
66. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.5 (Supp. 1983).
67. See Note, 01/and Gas: Legislative Damage to Surface Rights, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 386, 387-
89 (1983). Actually, the lessee will probably sublease to an independent contractor to do the
actual drilling or mining. Id. at 389.
68. Rich v. Doneghey, 71 Okla. 204, 207, 177 P. 86, 89-90 (1918).
69. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
70. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.5 (Supp. 1983).
71. See Lowe, Representing the Landowner in 01/and Gas Leasing Transactions, 31 OKLA. L.
REv. 257, 268-71 (1978); Note, Oil and Gas: Does the Oil and Gas Lessee Have a Duty to Restore
the Surface?, 25 OKLA. L. REV. 572, 573 (1972).
72. See Michelman, Property, Utilitv, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214-18 (1967) (discusses the demoralizing
effect that failure to pay just compensation has on other property owners).
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it is less likely that the landowner or mineral owner will feel victimized.
If, however, the courts view each set of circumstances independently
and render decisions that are sometimes fair and sometimes not be-
cause of the vague concepts of reasonableness and necessity, 73 the un-
justly injured party and his supporters will become disenchanted with
the government and judicial process. Society will pay a price for this
demoralization if the injured parties choose to flaunt other laws due to
their belief that society has done them an injustice which entitles them
to their "pound of flesh."'74  Arguably, the Oklahoma Act eliminates
much of this uncertainty by imposing strict liability on the mineral
owner. Initially, this might seem unfair to the mineral owner or lessee,
but the relative bargaining power and expertise of these two parties75
normally places them in a better position to know and protect their
rights.
Elimination of uncertainty in the law also helps facilitate planning
that ultimately leads to more efficient use of the surface.76 The land-
owner need not fear that he will be left uncompensated when he begins
the process of putting his land to use only to have his work destroyed
by a drilling or mining operation. 77 This enables the landowner to en-
gage in long-range planning without fearing that his plans will be for
naught.
With these potential public purposes in mind, it appears less likely
that a court will strike down the Oklahoma Act on the basis of the
takings clause. This is particularly so because of the deference the
United States Supreme Court has granted to the judgment of legisla-
tures in selecting public purposes that justify the exercise of eminent
domain.78 In fact, this deferential attitude formed the basis for uphold-
73. See supra text accompanying note 63.
74. One need look no further for proof of this concept than the many taxpayers that do not
file completely honest returns because of their belief that the government "short changed" them at
some other time.
75. See supra text accompanying note 65.
76. See Dycus, supra note 22, at 883.
77. See id. A portion of the surface damages problem have been eliminated or reduced by
modern mining and drilling methods. See id. at 881-82. Even so, the development of some miner-
als, such as coal, still requires the complete destruction of the surface. See id. at 882.
78. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Berman recognizes that "the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs. ... Id. The Court also declared that
"when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclu-
sive." Id. This philosophy is in keeping with the trend toward judicial deference to legislatures in
areas of economic concern. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-7
(1978) (discusses the downfall of the socioeconomic philosophy of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) and the ensuing trend toward judicial abdication in favor of legislative judgment). Cf.
Palmer Oil Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 204 Okla. 543, 547, 231 P.2d 997, 1002 (1951) (the
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ing the North Dakota Surface Damages Act, which is the only reported
decision that addresses the constitutionality of a surface damages act.79
2. Just Compensation and the Police Power
Assuming the Oklahoma legislature identified a legitimate public
purpose, the exercise of the power of eminent domain still requires
compensation to the deprived property owner. The Oklahoma Act
contains no such provision and the mineral estate owner does not re-
ceive any corresponding benefit that could be regarded as compensa-
tion. Without further investigation, the Act would seem to be
unconstitutional for its failure to pay the mineral owner compensation.
However, not every shifting of property rights is classified as an exer-
cise of eminent domain that requires compensation. If the Act is
merely an exercise of the State's police power no compensation is re-
quired." It is, therefore, essential to properly characterize the State's
action as either involving an exercise of the police power or eminent
domain; unfortunately, it frequently is not easy to distinguish between
the two.
The focus of both powers is on public concerns, though a state's
police power is couched in more specific terms than the power of emi-
nent domain.8' It is, however, a vain effort to try to determine if com-
pensation is required by drawing subtle distinctions between the public
purposes required by eminent domain and the police power. Since the
goal of both powers is to achieve some public purpose, characterization
of an action is really a decision whether costs should be shouldered by
the individual whose property rights are affected or by the public at
large.82 Policy makers appear to have two alternatives. One is to make
court upheld a unitization statute and rejected constitutional challenges based on the contract and
equal protection clauses by deferring selection of the purposes and means to the legislature).
79. See Murphy v. Amoco Prod. Co., 558 F. Supp. 591 (D.N.D. 1983). This court upheld an
alleged retroactive application of the North Dakota Surface Damages Act after finding the Act
bore a rational relationship to the State's desire to protect agricultural production. Id. at 595-96.
Nevertheless, the precedential value of this case is suspect, even in North Dakota, because it in-
volved a federal court's attempt to apply state law in an area where none existed. The federal
court relied upon dictum in a North Dakota Supreme Court decision that indicated the court
disapproved of the common law imposition of liability on the surface owner. Id. (citing Hunt Oil
Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 135 (N.D. 1979)).
80. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 42, at 480; Sax, Takings, Private
Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 149 (1971); Michelman, supra note 72, at 1167.
81. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
82. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co.
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1978); Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). See
also Michelman, supra note 72, at 1168-69 (argues that this determination is really a social
method for deciding who shall bear the cost of meeting the needs of the public).
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the mineral owner bear the loss recognizing that the state's police
power periodically exacts a burden on every individual as part of the
cost of living in an ordered society. The second alternative is to have
the taxpayers compensate the mineral owner recognizing that the
power of eminent domain exacts a heavy burden that is too much for
one individual to bear.83
In determining the necessity for compensation, courts attempt to
categorize by focusing on the property taken and any attendant activity
on the property. It has long been established that compensation is re-
quired when the government physically invades and ousts the owner of
property. 84 Under the early common law this was the only type of tak-
ing that required compensation.8" The Supreme Court has, however,
recognized that a deprivation of property can occur without a physical
takeover. 6 This often occurs when the government restricts or prohib-
its certain uses of private property in order to avoid disputes between
the individual property owners.87 The conflict between the surface and
mineral estates is a good example of this situation since the mineral
estate cannot be put to effective use without interfering with the surface
estate. It is under these types of circumstances, where there is no physi-
cal invasion and ouster, that it becomes most difficult to determine if
compensation is required.
The Supreme Court dealt with the mineral estate versus the sur-
face estate issue in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.88 In Mahon, the
court recognized that property rights are subject to regulation through
the state's police power,89 but if the state's action "reaches a certain
magnitude. . . there must be an exercise of the power of eminent do-
main and compensation to sustain the act." 90 Further, "the general
rule. . . is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."9'
83. See Michelman, supra note 72, at 1168-69.
84. See, e.g., Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878). A typical example is
when the government condemns and razes a house so that a new highway may be constructed.
85. See id.
86. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
87. See Sax, supra note 80, at 151-55.
88. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
89. Id. at 413.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 415. This approach has been criticized by Professor Michelman as diverging from
any real reliance on considerations of fairness by pinning down an arbitrary point lying some-
where between fifty and one hundred percent as being the proportion of diminution that would
require compensation. His notion of the proper test is to see if the claimant has been practically
deprived of "some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, investment-backed expectation." See
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Determination of the point where regulation goes too far and com-
pensation is required is a difficult task.92 There is no specific formula
for making this assessment,93 but the Supreme Court has stated that the
economic impact of a regulation, particularly the extent that the regula-
tion interferes with the "distinct investment-backed expectations" of a
claimant, helps to determine the necessity for compensation.94 This ap-
pears to mean that if property can still be put to use for profit, though
not in the particular fashion the owner had in mind, no compensation
is required.95 Even so, much depends upon the facts of each case.96
By focusing on the facts presented in Mahon, it initially appears
that Oklahoma must compensate the operator of the mineral estate for
the value of the surface easement taken from him. This is so because
the Mahon Court found compensation necessary97 under facts strik-
ingly similar to those presented by the Oklahoma Act.98 In Mahon, a
coal company executed a deed that conveyed the surface but retained
the right to remove all coal under the surface.99 The deed expressly
stated that the grantee assumed the risk that the surface might be dam-
aged by coal extraction."° Years later, the Pennsylvania legislature en-
acted a statute forbidding coal extraction that caused any structure to
subside.10' When the company's extraction threatened to sink Mahon's
residence, he sought an injunction in accordance with the statute.10 2
Michelman, supra note 72, at 1233. Recent Supreme Court decisions interpret Mahon in accord-
ance with Professor Michelman's view. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
92. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1922). Justice Holmes, the
author of the Mahon opinion, applied a balancing test that compares the relative benefits to the
public with the diminution in value of the property. The less important the public purpose or the
greater the diminution in value, the more likely a taking will be found. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-
16. This test has not been widely followed in subsequent decisions. See Dycus, supra note 22, at
914.
93. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
94. Id.
95. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). The Supreme Court expressed it by saying,
"At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one
'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Id. at
65-66. The Court pointed out that the mere decrease in value was not enough because the claim-
ant in this case could use the property in an alternative fashion for profit. Id. See also Dycus,
supra note 22, at 915-16 & n.216 (Professor Dycus is of the opinion that "distinct investment-
backed expectations" referred to in Penn Central refers to the right to make a profit); Sax, supra
note 80, at 156 n.18 (interprets Mahon as also requiring the right to make a profit).
96. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 123 (1922).
97. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14.
98. See Note, supra note 11, at 424-26 (argues that Mahon compels a finding that the
Oklahoma Act is unconstitutional because no compensation is awarded to the mineral owner).
99. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 412-13.
102. Id. at 412.
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The Supreme Court held that enactment of the Pennsylvania statute
was not a legitimate exercise of the State's police power.103
Mahon, however, varies from the situation created by the
Oklahoma Act in one essential respect, thus making it more probable
that the Act would be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the State's
police power. The statute in Mahon called for the absolute prohibition
of mining activity that caused subsidence, effectively destroying the
mineral owner's right to mine coal and his investment-backed expecta-
tions.'t 4 The Oklahoma Act, on the other hand, merely shifts liability
for damages from the surface owner to the mineral owner without af-
fecting the mineral owner's right to produce the fruits of the estate.'
The Act does not foreclose the rights of the operator to subjugate the
minerals; it merely adds another item to the cost of production that, in
many instances, is required by contract anyway.10 6 This leads to the
conclusion that the Oklahoma Act is a mere exercise of the State's po-
lice power requiring no compensation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the Oklahoma Act could possibly be applied retroac-
tively without violating the contract clause, judicial response to the Act
is likely to call for prospective application for at least two reasons.
First, the interpretation that the Act applies only prospectively is logi-
cal and more facially apparent. Second, Oklahoma courts presume
prospective application unless there is a clear expression of contrary
intent. '0 7
Interpreting the Act to apply prospectively, however, will not
avoid the takings issue. Even so, the takings clause does not pose a
serious threat to the Act since the Act appears to further a number of
public purposes. Additionally, compensation is not necessary since the




103. Id at 414.
104. Id. at 413-14. Justice Holmes stated, "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that
it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has
very nearly the same effect. . . as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414.
105. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.5 (Supp. 1983).
106. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 42-106 and accompanying text.
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Author's Note : Immediately prior to publication of this Comment,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court ordered the Bowles opinion withdrawn
from publication and denied certiorari. 0 9 Withdrawal from publica-
tion means that the Bowles decision will not be published in the Pacific
Reporter and will thus, have no precedential or persuasive value110
These developments call the Bowles interpretation that the Act only
applies prospectively into question. On the other hand, withdrawal of
the opinion will have no effect on the current constitutional status of
the Act since the Bowles court did not address the constitutional
issues. " '
109. Order, 55 OKLA. B.J. 1991 (October 6, 1984).
110. Despite the fact that Bowles carries no precedential or persuasive value, the decision is
still the law of the case. Mandate, 55 OKLA. B.J. 2076 (October 13, 1984).
111. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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